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FROM BLACK AND WHITE TO HIGH DEFINITION
EQUAL PROTECTION*
Seth F. Kreimer**

During the last two generations, we have witnessed two successive trans
formations in equal protection, one in the area of race, and one in the area of
gender. I take it as my task during the next few minutes to speculate on
where comparable constitutional evolution might emerge during the begin
ning of the twenty-first century.
In exploring this issue, I submit that, in large part, demography is
destiny. Both the constitutional revolution in racial equality and the trans
formation in the law of gender equality were conditioned by broader changes
in the structure of our society and there is every reason to expect the pattern
to continue_l
Neither the constitutional issues of race nor sex are on the verge of dis
appearing. Indeed, the issue of racial disparity in American society has
proven more refractory than any but the most hardened pessimist would
have predicted twenty years ago. But the twenty-first century will raise new
challenges as well, and it is on some of these issues that I want to focus.
Therefore, let me sketch three demographic trends involving immigration,
families, and the aging of American society, and lay out some of the ques
tions the trends are likely to raise in the next decades.
I.

IMMIGRATION

America has always been, to one degree or another, a nation of immi
grants. During the period between 1921 and 1965, however, restrictive fed
eral policies cut immigration to a relative trickle. By contrast, during the last
two decades, immigration has approached the peak levels of the early twenti
eth century. During the first decade of the twentieth century, 10 million im*
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l. During the 1950s and 1960s, t he American constitutional sy stem began to wrestle with
the problem of uprooting the Jim Crow system and beginning to address the legacy of slavery.
The issues in the court s were prefigured and conditioned by the great migration of African
Americans from South to North during the decades preceding Brown
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U. S. 483 (1954), as well as by t he experience of the nation in World War II.
During the 1970s and 1980s, t he constitutional problem of applying guarantees of equalit y
to the status of women came t o the fore in a variety of areas. Here, again, the constitut ional
issues reflected secular trends in society; during t he decade before, medical t echnology began to
provide women with unprecedented control of t heir reproductive capacities, while at the same
t ime, women moved out of the home and into t he workplace.
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migrants passed through Ellis Island. By the time the twentieth century
closes, America will have absorbed 20 million immigrants in twenty years.2
Even if we were to end immigration immediately, this would constitute the
beginning of a social transformation. Today, we inhabit a society with a
larger proportion of foreign-born residents than any time since the beginning
of the Great Depression. In 1970, 5% of American residents had been born
abroad; today, 24.5 million American residents-more than 9% of the total
population-are foreign born.3 And immigration is likely to continue.
The pressure of this new wave of immigration has generated three over
lapping groups that are likely to seek constitutional protection. The first
group, American residents who speak languages other than English, came to
the Supreme Court this Term in Arizonans for Offi cial English v. Arizona.4
To set the case in context, we should realize that, in 1972, American schools
educated 250,000 children in bilingual or English as second language pro
grams; in 1992. the number swelled to 2.5 million. Today, well over 10 mil
lion American residents speak primary languages other than English.
Arizona had, by voter initiative, adopted English as its "official lan
guage." The Arizonan initiative further had forbidden its officials to transact
business in other languages. This potentially excluded linguistic minorities
from a variety of public services and information. The Ninth Circuit's deci
sion in Arizonans, invalidating the initiative, had focused on the First
Amendment right of officials to speak to the public in an understandable
fashion. as well as the public's correlative right to receive information. It was
informed by concerns that the members of the excluded public constituted
constitutionally protected political and racial minorities.5
The Supreme Court dismissed Arizonans on standing grounds,6 but it
seems entirely plausible that the issue of the treatment of linguistic minorities
will come to the courts again in the next decade. Twenty-one states currently
have "official English" provisions in their fundamental laws and efforts are
underway to adopt such provisions in numerous of other states and localities
around the country. The New York Regents' recent decision regarding test
ing in foreign languages, and the ongoing debate on bilingual education are
likely to push the federal courts to resolve the tension between aspirations

2. During the 1980s, legal immigration added over 8.5 million residents to the American
popul ation.

A comparabl e number of documented immigrants are predicted to arrive in

America during the 1990s. Combined with undocumented immigrants, the 1990's immigration
exceeds the 10 million who arrived through Ellis Island during the first decade of the century.
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. J'v!.-'.RCH 1996 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: POPULATION BY
CouNTRY OF BIRTH, CiTIZENSHIP AND YEAR OF ENTRY (1996) [hereinafter MARCH 1996 U.S.
CENSUS BuREAU].
4. 117 s. Ct. 1055 (1997).
5. Yniguez v. Arizonans for O fficial English, 69 F. 3cl 920 (9th Cir. 1995).
6.

Arizonans for Official English.

117 S. Ct. at 1060.
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for national unity and the claims of new Americans to inclusion as equals
within the mainstream of our society.7
The second group which is likely to seek protection from the courts is
comprised of legal residents who are not citizens. Of 24.5 million foreign
born American residents, only 8 million are naturalized citizens.8 If fiscal
austerity continues to constrict public services and benefits, and if the em
ployment market continues to tighten in some sectors of the economy, the
next decade is likely to showcase continued efforts to use lack of citizenship
as basis for excluding otherwise eligible permanent residents from public
benefits. So, too, efforts to bar non-citizens from other economic opportuni
ties may gain renewed prominence during the next decade, justified by the
same reasoning. A generation ago, in Graham v. Richardson,9 a unanimous
Supreme Court held that alienage was a suspect classification and barred
states from discriminating on the basis of citizenship in the provision of pub
lic benefits and most employment.10 By contrast, five years later, Matthews
1 held that the federal government was free to exclude non-citizens
v. D iaz 1
from Medicare, a decision justified on the basis of federal interests in restrict
ing immigration.12 As foreshadowed by an insistent majority of the Court in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,13 the next decade is likely to include re
newed pressure to maintain consistency in the constitutional obligations of
state and federal governments.l4
Finally, the growth in the population of undocumented aliens during the
years following the 1986 amnesty, to an estimated 5 million in 1996, has trig
gered a series of backlashes. Most concretely, efforts to enforce American
immigration laws by arrest and deportation have grown increasingly harsh,
putting further stress on Fourth Amendment rights and rights to judicial re
view. In California, Proposition 187, which excluded undocumented aliens
from access to public services such as education and public health benefits, is
likely to replicate itself in other areas. At the federal level, Congress has
entertained efforts to revoke the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
birthright citizenship for children of resident aliens. A decade and a half ago,
in Plyler v. Doe,15 a fragmented Court held that Texas could not exclude the
children of undocumented aliens from its public school system.1 6 The plural
ity reasoned that Texas' public policy threatened to create a "permanent
caste of undocumented resident aliens" barred from the mainstream of
7. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding San Francisco public school system
viol ated§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to provide language instruction to 1800
non -English speaking Chinese students).
8. MARCH 1996 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU.
9. 403 u.s. 365 (1971).
10. fd. at 383.
11. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).

12. fd. at 69.
13. 515 U. S. 200 (1995).
14.

!d.

at 213-18.

15. 457 u.s. 202 (1982).
16. /d.
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American societyY Proposition 187 and its clones will bring the issue to the
Court again in the next decade, with potentially fateful consequences.
II. FAMILIES

In addition to influences from without, the reconfiguration of traditional
family relations is transforming American society from within. Half of the
marriages in 1997 are likely to end in divorce and unmarried parenthood has
lost its legal, as well as much of its social, stigma. Between unmarried
parenthood and divorce, the proportion of children in single parent families
has risen from roughly 14% in 1970, to 30% in 1995. Even in two parent
families, full-time stay-at-home parenthood and the "family wage" has be
come a minority pattern.
Single parent families are more brittle than families with two parents; on
average, they have less emotional and economic resources with which to
withstand pressures and shocks, and to take care of children. The state,
therefore, increasingly is called upon to provide supports to bolster the fam
ily structure and to intervene when that structure breaks down. As compared
to even a decade ago, many more children today end up in the care of state
sponsored institutions on a part-time or full-time basis. The state intervenes
more often and more directly in family relations. And today, more children
end up in the custody of state agencies. As one benchmark, the foster care
system of 1997 houses almost half a million children, while in 1985, that
number reached only 250,000. If, as some predict, the restructuring of the
current welfare system drives a million more children into poverty, we can
also expect the number of children in state custody to expand. If states re
spond to the void left by recent federal initiatives seeking to decrease the
preference for family preservation, the ranks of children in state care will
swell still further.
The breakdown of traditional family relations may have a number of
constitutional consequences during the next decade. First, the courts will be
called on to ensure the protection of children. In Deshaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services, 18 the Supreme Court disavowed a
constitutional obligation to preserve the welfare of children against parental
violence or neglect as a matter of substantive due process. 1 9 For children in
foster care, pre-school, or after-school programs, however, DeShaney does
not eliminate judicial scrutiny.20 Moreover, the equality of protective serv17. !d.

18. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
19. !d. at 195-203.
20. Id. at 201 n.9; Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constiuaional Standards
for the State's Duty to Protect Foster Children, 29 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 38 5 390 (1996); see
also Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms and the Due Process Clause. 94
MICH. L. REv. 982 (1996) (criticizing DeShaney holding).
,
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ices remains a constitutional issue after DeShaney.21 Both opinions arc i m
portant; because, particularly for the 20% of American children who live in
poverty, often there will be no voice of authority to speak for children except
the courts.22
Second, the courts will be called upon to protect the family. A genera
tion ago, the Warren and Burger courts successively established constitu
tional limits on the authority of the state to interfere with the relations of
traditional nuclear families, of extended families,23 and of unmarried par
ents.24 The current Court shows no signs of retreating from those limits.
This Term, in M.L. B. v. S. L.J. ,25 a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg
invalidated a Mississippi transcript fee requirement that effectively barred
indigents from appealing terminations of their parental rights.20 The opinion
used doctrines of equal protection dating from the Warren Court era to es
tablish a mother's right to "defend against the State's destruction of her fam
ily bonds, and to resist the brand associated with a parental unfitness
adjudication" despite her indigence.27
As families dissolve and reconfigure under contemporary economic and
social pressures, we are likely to see more plaintiffs seeking to invoke consti
tutional protection from states' efforts to force family relations into politi
cally acceptable pattems. The most prominent, though perhaps not the most
prevalent, of these issues is likely to focus on the state's treatment of family
members who are gay or lesbian.
Last Term, in Romer v. Evans,28 the same six member M.L.B. majority
struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment depriving gay and
lesbian citizens of access to all protection under state and local human rights
law.29 Romer is a notoriously opaque case, representing anything from the


21. 489 U. S. at 197 n . 3; cf. Nabozny v. Podlesn y, 92 F. 3d 446, 457-58 (7th Cir.1996) (fin din g
1056, JOSS
(1st Cir. 1997) (fin ding refusal to prosecute viol ence against women n ot action able).
school's refusal to protect gay studen t actionable). But see Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d

22. Likewise, with the witherin g of f amilies and other in termediate in stitutions. schools
emerge as more an d more crucial f actors in shapi n g life chances. It would be n o surprise to
observe a resurgence of efforts to address in equalities in education , although state con stitution al
guarantees of equality are likely to be more fruitful lines of in quiry for plain tiffs.
Enrich, Leaving £quo/icy Behind: New

See, e.g., Peter
Directions in Schoof Finance Refo rm 48 VAND. L. REv.
,

101

(1995) (suggestin g education fun ding debate should be issue of adequacy an d n ot equality):
Stewart G. Pollock, The An of Judging, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 591 (1996) (reviewi n g New Jersey's
experien ce with judicially mandate d school fin ance reform); William E. Thro, Judicial Ana(vsis
During 1he Third Wave of Schoof Finance Litigation: The Massachuserts Decision as a Model, 35
B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994) (exploring "third wave" of school finance system); William F. Dietz.
Note. !Vlanageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform Liligation, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1193
(1996) (discussin g education reform in state courts).
23. Moore v. City of East Clevelan d, 431 U. S. 494
24.

Stanley v. Ill in ois, 405 U. S.

25. 117 S. Ct.

555 (1996).

26. !d. at 558.

27. !d.
28. 116 S. Ct. 1620

29. /d. at 1629.

(1996).

645 (1972).

(1977).
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Court's germinating recognition of social hostility to gays and lesbians as con
stitutionally invidious, to a broader skepticism of voter initiatives which sin
gle out a status-based "solitary class" for exclusion from important state
benefits.
In light of Romer, we are also likely to see an emerging line of constitu
tional litigation regarding efforts directed against families of gays and lesbi
ans. On one hand, in states where gay and lesbian parents cannot adopt, or
are deprived of parental rights because of their sexual orientation, Romer
will ground challenges to these policies. On the other hand, whether or not
Hawaii's same-sex marriage initiative survives,30 we can safely predict that
some same-sex relationships will be granted legal status in some states, just as
a number of states presently use second-parent adoptions or joint custody to
protect parental relationships in gay and lesbian families. When such particu
lar state sanctioned families migrate to another state, we are likely to see
constitutional challenges to the new state's refusal to recognize the legal sta
tus of those families.
III. AGING
The third demographic trend that will shape the twenty-first century will
be the aging of the American population. On one front, this is simply a func
tion of the size of age cohorts. In 1970, 20 million Americans were age sixty
five or older-10% of the population. Today, the number has grown to 35
million, or 12%. By the time the bulk of the baby-boom population hits re
tirement age in 2020, 58 million Americans or more are likely to be sixty-five
or older, a proportion that will represent almost 20% of the American popu
lation. Not only will there be more elderly Americans, but the elderly are
likely to live longer. Twenty years ago, only .7% of Americans, or 1.4 mil
lion, were eighty-five years or older. Today, this group has more than
doubled, to 3.8 million, or 1.4%, and that number, as well as the proportion
of the population, is likely to double again during the next fifteen years.
These trends likely will spawn a number of constitutional issues.31 We
clearly can expect that the health care needs for this group likely will grow
out of proportion to the group's numbers. On average, individuals over
sixty-five consume health care resources at a rate three times that of adults in
the twenty-five to fifty bracket. Moreover, the biomedical revolution contin
ues to expand the health care that is technically available. In 1972, for exam
ple, 14,000 heart by-pass operations were performed annually in the United
States. By 1992, there were over 400,000 such operations performed. There
is every reason to believe that the growth of other medical treatment during
30. Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.A.9l-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw.
1996) (h olding t hat Hawaii fail ed to prove compel l ing state interest in denying

Cir. Ct . Dec.

3,

marriage l icense

t o same-sex couple).

31.

The expectat ions of an aging societ y are also l ikel y t o spur further easing of rest rictions

on immigration as a way of providing additional employees t o a work-force that is not being
replaced by biological means.
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the next decade and a half will be equally expansive. Thus, by the first dec
ade of the next century, we are likely to be faced with a huge demand for life
extending medical expenditures from a group that is moving out of the work
force, a group with a vastly increasing need for long-term care.
If, as seems likely, government continues to step in to meet only part of
the funding need, the courts will review a public system that effectively ra
tions life-saving medical care. Already, some lower courts are beginning to
impose procedural limitations on the denial of care by publicly financed man
aged care entities.32 For a generation, the equal protection clause has been
read to prohibit states from excluding from health care migrants from other
states.:n ln a polarized politics of scarcity, it is easy to imagine calls for con
stitutional intervention in the likely emerging system of health care rationing.
A second possible constitutional conflict arises from the fact that the
diseases characteristic of the aging are not acute, but chronic. Old age is thus
likely to bring not only increased medical needs, but increased disabilities
and suffering. With an ever growing proportion of the population both suffer
ing and medically needy, there will be the temptation to convince this aging
population to end its life, and thus end its drain on the economic system.
Already, last Term, the Supreme Court confronted whether states may pro
hibit physician-assisted suicide, even though states allow voluntary termina
tion of life support.34 The Court rejected constitutional objections to this
policy, holding that a state may distinguish between competent refusal of
treatment and requests for assisted suicide. The issue during the next twenty
years, however, will likely not be whether the state may forbid assisted sui
cide, but whether the state may selectively encourage it. Indeed, when we
recognize that among the hugely expanding group of Americans age eighty
five and older, Alzheimer's and other dementias are likely to be highly preva
lent, the question of what protections will be provided to impaired or institu
tionalized citizens becomes crucial.
IV.

HIGH DEFINITION EQUAL PROTECTION?

The predominant equal protection doctrine with which we enter the
twenty-first century has been a doctrine in black and white characterized by a
bifurcation between the deferential "rational basis scrutiny" and "strict or
heightened" scrutiny of "suspect classifications" of race and gender. This
32. E.g., Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding decisions by
certified home health agencies denying services constitute "state actions" requiring procedural
due process); Grijalva v. Shalala, 946 F. Supp. 747, 753 (D. Ariz. 1996) (stating Medicare HMO
decision denying services is "state action" requiring procedural due process).
33. E.g.. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (ruling Arizona's
residency requirement as pre-condition to indigent receipt of county-paid health care violates
Equal Protection).
34. See Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997) (holding New York prohibition against
assisted suicide not violative of Equal Protection); Washington v. Glucksberg,

117

S. Ct. 225S.

2275 (1997) (finding no liberty interest in assisted suicide and Washington state ban on assisted
suicide "rationally related" to legitimate state interest).

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

1172

scheme has proved barely sufficient to meet contemporary issues; it seems
unlikely to prove adequate to meet the emerging social stresses of the next
generation. Just as our television programs have moved from the black and
white of the 1950s, through the color programs of the 1970s, to the High
Definition

TV

of today, as we enter the next millennium, the challenge for

the courts will be to move from the black and white deference of "rational
basis" or "strict scrutiny," toward a High Definition Equal Protection doc
trine for the 21st century.

